

Si Vis Pacem, Para Pacem: **Training for Humanitarian Emergencies**

Major John A. Nagl, US Army, and Cadet Elizabeth O. Young, USMA

We live in an age of “heavy peace.” . . . There will be other Kosovos, and, whether for strategic or humanitarian reasons—or just muddled impulses—we will not be able to resist them all. . . . We cannot enter upon such commitments under the assumption that they will be temporary and brief. . . . We must stop pretending those challenges will disappear—that “something will turn up”—and prepare to meet them.¹

—Ralph Peters

WITH THE END of the Cold War and the rise of ethnonationalistic conflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs) have proliferated around the world. Internal conflicts that combine large-scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, social and political institutions are becoming commonplace. War remains a common feature of the international landscape despite growing global interdependence.² While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of great-power conflict, it has also decreased the perceived constraints on proxy wars, and as a result, over 40 unresolved conflicts currently fester, simmer or rage. International peacekeeping forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most cases, but they can stop the fighting and help implement fair and lasting resolutions.³

While the US Army prepares to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, it will frequently be called upon to provide the military forces necessary to implement our nation’s multifaceted response to CHEs.⁴ Even though peace operations and preventing deadly conflict are becoming increasingly common missions, the Army currently treats each CHE as an exception; it engages in little routine preparation for such events.⁵ This problem is

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now known and discussed beyond the corridors of the Pentagon or the fields of Fort Bragg. Major newsmagazines and newspapers regularly debate the issue, including the report that “of all the services, the Army has had the most difficult transition from a Cold War force ready to defeat the Soviet Union to the sort of nimble force needed to fight wars like the one in Kosovo.”⁶


The Army has conducted a number of joint, multinational, multiorganizational, multiagency and multicultural exercises to better prepare our troops for these new challenges, but they are still administered ad hoc. Because the US military, particularly the Army, is overwhelmed by internal debate concerning when and how to provide humanitarian assistance, it has not created the necessary precrisis training that numerous after-action reviews have stressed is crucial for success in these operations.⁷ The Army must immediately adjust while continuing to debate the options of creating a two-tier military establishment complete with a constabulary force, changing the structure of the force to make deployments easier or simply not getting involved.⁸ Such modifications are crucial, for involvement in CHEs will not wait until the debate over America’s role in the post-Cold War world has been resolved.⁹

The Army must create a routine training program to make the US response to CHEs more successful.

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The military needs to understand better the requirements and philosophies of the NGOs and the functions of specific organizations. A roundtable discussion at the Strategic Studies Institute explained that "in military terms, humanitarian affairs are the primary effort and military activity the supporting effort in most peace operations." All CTC training should likewise involve NGOs, other government agencies and other nations.

Unless the Army creates specialized units whose primary mission is to respond to CHEs, all units must have the ability to perform them. Hence, in keeping with our "train as you fight" philosophy, all National Training Center (NTC), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations should include a CHE scenario both leading up to and building down from a typical mid-intensity conflict (MIC) scenario (see figure). This scenario more accurately reflects the situations in which our military is likely to find itself involved and presents a greater training challenge to US forces.



The Army must more actively prepare for CHEs. RAND researcher Jennifer Morrison Taw noted that "the Army is the most likely of all US military services to pay the price for failings in interagency coordination."¹⁰ US policy implementation in Bosnia lacks a mechanism to ensure effective integration of the civilian and military peacebuilding programs at the tactical, operational or strategic level. The only integration thus far was at the operational level and occurred ad hoc. As a result, the military conditions for success of the Dayton Peace Accord were largely met, but the situation on the ground was never transformed into a condition from which the military could withdraw. As the first NATO commander of that mission, now retired General George A. Joulwan noted, "Because of this dilemma, there is no clear path from stabilization to normalization and no prognosis as to when the very visible military commitment to peacekeeping in Bosnia and

Herzegovina can be brought to a close. The conditions that facilitate transition to normalization . . . have not been established."¹¹

Unless we begin fostering such integration, the Army will be less effective and remain committed to these operations longer than if it were better trained for the demands of CHEs.

Civil-Military Coordination's Three Chief Problems

Currently, three chief problems impede effective and efficient US military responses to CHEs: the formation of multinational military coalitions; the relationship between the military and other government agencies and nongovernment and humanitarian relief organizations; and the preparation of individual soldiers.

The formation of multinational military coalitions. Today's CHEs require a multidimensional response, relying on multinational military forces, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), UN agencies and many other political and military actors. To be more effective in CHEs, civil and military efforts require increased coordination and integration to maximize each player's contribution and avoid redundancies and contradictory efforts. Joulwan, who was instrumental in establishing the multidimensional Partnership for Peace program, notes that in these missions "success is not measured solely by military success, but primarily by civilian success."¹²

CHEs must be addressed by politically unified and militarily effective coalitions. International cooperation to resolve CHEs can reduce the US burden and disperse responsibility.¹³ The prospects for increased participation will improve if countries feel more confident that the international community can collectively manage military interventions with limited losses.¹⁴ However, it flies in the face of reason to expect troops from widely disparate armies to work in harmony without preparation.¹⁵ For example, in Cambodia, 35 countries participated in the peacekeeping force—a recipe for coordination difficulties.¹⁶ Multinational force commanders must therefore understand the divergent training quality among their military contingents.¹⁷

The best way to offset these sorts of problems is to establish multinational training on the tactical, organizational and strategic levels. First Sergeant Michael Prickett, Company C, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, recently participated in CENTRAZBAT '98, a multinational peacekeeping exercise which brought 160 soldiers from the 10th

Mountain Division together with soldiers from Turkey, Russia and five former Soviet republics. Re-counting the experience, Prickett noted that “in this age of multinational peacekeeping operations, where you must work closely with soldiers from other countries, this kind of training is very, very valuable. Knowing how other armies do business is a big deal when you actually have to go into a real-world situation with them.”¹⁸ Private Dickey Young, a B Company rifleman, added that “it’s different when you’re actually working with people from other countries, getting to fire their weapons and living in the same area with them.”¹⁹

These exercises have more than symbolic importance. They can foster interoperability as participating forces practice combined peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations at platoon and company levels.²⁰ Such training increases the efficiency of US forces in responding to CHEs, especially at the tactical level, where these operations succeed or fail.

The civil-military relationship. Dealing with the vast number of NGOs and PVOs that typically respond to CHEs can be frustrating and confusing for both the military and its civilian counterparts.²¹ Military objectives, capabilities and perspectives on the problem could hardly be more unlike those of the NGOs.²² Regardless of how frustrating or confusing this coordination is, we must remember that “although military forces can maintain an absence of war, they cannot themselves build peace.”²³ Max G. Manwaring remarked that “contemporary conflict requires strategic planning and cooperation between and among coalition partners, international organizations, nongovernment organizations and the US civil-military representation.”²⁴ In these new missions, a range of issues must be addressed virtually simultaneously—from economic, political and military to social, cultural and legal.²⁵ Thus, “the creation of an integrating structure is among the most daunting challenges the international community confronts.”²⁶

Despite numerous involvements in CHEs, we have still not done it right. Preparing for and then responding to CHEs requires increased coordination with NGOs, PVOs and other US government agencies.²⁷ A recent RAND publication focused solely on the problem of interagency coordination in CHEs, noting that “even among US agencies alone, such coordination is difficult to achieve. US interagency processes remain fraught with competition and confusion, and lack authority and accountability. Neither the military nor the civilian agencies are sufficiently familiar with each other’s capabilities, objectives or limitations to

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Department of Defense

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effectively coordinate their activities.”²⁸

Beyond US interagency coordination lies the far more daunting task of dealing with NGOs. For example, in Somalia dealing with 78 NGOs was difficult for the military, but “coordination among agencies at the outset helped alleviate tensions.”²⁹ The military needs to understand better the requirements and philosophies of the NGOs and the functions of specific organizations. A roundtable discussion at the Strategic Studies Institute explained that “in military terms, humanitarian affairs are the primary effort and military activity the supporting effort in most peace operations.”³⁰ All CTC training should likewise involve NGOs, other government agencies and other nations.³¹

The Army must consider NGOs as “a resource with vital experience and unequalled knowledge.

They should be accepted as full partners.”³² Often, NGOs and PVOs precede military forces into crisis areas where US peace operations take place. Many of these agencies will already have established a close rapport with the belligerents and local nationals in the area. Thus, “in establishing its

Institutionalizing CHE training carries with it the perception of permanence. However, training for and participating in CHEs will not necessarily degrade warfighting opportunities for most units. The key is to preserve warfighting skills while augmenting effectiveness at peace operations since “war-fighting and peace operations must not become alternatives but compatible and symbiotic techniques aimed at a common goal.”

own role as a benefactor, the task force must form a close civil-military partnership with these agencies, which will help ensure unity of effort and implementation of effective programs. The first step in the synchronization of these efforts requires civil and military components to reach a common appreciation of each other’s capabilities, which should lead to a greater degree of mutual respect.”³³

The Army’s after-action review from Operation *Support Hope* in Rwanda stressed the need to build bridges with the UN and NGO communities before a crisis occurs and develop training that focuses on integrating capabilities.³⁴ Many civilian agencies are wary of working with, being associated with, or being overwhelmed by the military. However, Taw noted that frequently NGOs reluctant to work with the military are simply unfamiliar with military capabilities, objectives and limitations.³⁵

It would be foolish to discount the cultural differences between the US military and civilian humanitarian agencies. Tension is inevitable when the military considers CHEs secondary missions to warfighting and while civilians involved see their primary mission as protecting and assisting innocent civilians.³⁶ Still, the only way to combat such parochialism is to begin working together. Overcoming these problems prior to deployment increases the chances of successful mission accomplishment. While organizational and cultural differences between civilian and military organizations do create problems in CHEs, “the bottom line was that inter-agency operational level coordination was incomplete in the preparation phase.”³⁷ Establishing ap-

propriate coordination mechanisms between these various services, agencies, nations and organizations in advance “may not guarantee success in an operation,” but an absence of such cooperation will “nearly always assure failure.”³⁸

The preparation of individual soldiers. While international collaboration among senior military commanders has increased, CHEs often still confuse individual soldiers. As Ralph Peters wrote, “we need to change the force to fit the times. . . . We must have soldiers of adequate quality in sufficient numbers, and they must be well trained and appropriately equipped. . . . When we think about the Army of the future. . . we need to start thinking from the soldier up.”³⁹

During Operation *Restore Hope*, the Army discovered that troops were bewildered by the overlap between combat missions and peacekeeping. Moreover, many military units were ill prepared for a mission that required a mind-set very different from the warrior ethos.⁴⁰ Because each soldier’s actions often carry significant political consequences, it is imperative to focus CHE training on the small-unit level.⁴¹

In addition to the tactical training for the soldiers, officers need special consideration. Our Army too often clings to traditional solutions, praising a “past that we do not understand.”⁴² Company and field grade officers need specialized training since they often must function “two levels higher” during CHEs, thinking and operating at the operational and strategic levels. Preparation for CHEs should account for broader command and political-military responsibilities borne by lower-ranking soldiers than is common in MIC.⁴³

A Proposal for Mandatory Training

To minimize the impact of civil-military coordination problems, multidimensional training must occur regularly. This training can be conducted when units deploy to the JRTC at Fort Polk, Louisiana; to the NTC in Fort Irwin, California; and to the CMTC in Hohenfels, Germany.⁴⁴ Requiring units to be proficient in operations relevant to CHEs and in their dealings with civilians will cause them to *prepare* for such training regularly.

The Army’s JRTC offers rough, realistic and stressful two-week exercises to improve the leadership and proficiency of military units. While the JRTC simulates low- to mid-intensity conflict, it can also simulate stability and support operations (SASO), the military’s term for CHEs.⁴⁵ In the summer of 1994, JRTC SASO simulation involved more than



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6,000 troops from various countries along with foreign observers and humanitarian aid representatives.⁴⁶ In the summer of 1996, JRTC replicated a combined and joint task force mission in an operational area similar to Bosnia or Somalia, complete with scenarios of ethnic strife, civil war and competing insurgencies. As one participant noted, "the realistic conditions posed by JRTC provided participants with the mental preparation and practical experience necessary to perform future peace operations."⁴⁷

The JRTC currently trains units scheduled for participation in Bosnia's Stabilization Force (SFOR) using a peacekeeping scenario approximately six months prior to their deployment overseas. Every unit that has participated in SFOR has first trained at the JRTC in a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). Six MRE's have been conducted, the most recent for the 49th Division of the Texas Army National Guard, which will act as the headquarters for units from the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which assumes the SFOR mission in March 2000.⁴⁸

While training prior to scheduled deployment on peacekeeping operations is certainly both sensible and appropriate, it is insufficient. The Army should integrate multidimensional operations that involve

multinational, NGOs, PVOs, UN participants and relevant US agencies into *all* JRTC, NTC and CMTC rotations. Current training scenarios at the NTC include a reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) phase, during which units drawing equipment secure the compound against terrorist threats, civilian protests and car bombs under the careful scrutiny of "the media," while also organizing military security for a UN relief mission. During the rotation itself, units confront more refugees, guerrillas, injured civilians and representatives of NGOs and PVOs on the battlefield, although soldiers in the brigade support area are challenged more intensely than those in the combat task forces.⁴⁹

These multidimensional training exercises should include actual members of civilian relief organizations. Preparing at the training centers prior to civilian and military involvement in an actual CHE will allow all parties involved to anticipate various problems and make the actual deployment and operation run more smoothly. Such training at the JRTC, NTC and CMTC will allow military commanders to work with their civilian counterparts and give regular soldiers an opportunity to prepare

psychologically and tactically for peacekeeping missions. The training will also benefit the NGOs, PVOs and other multinational forces that have never worked together in a simulated operational environment.

In addition to tactical training at the JRTC, NTC or CMTC, a staff officer training program should

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be conducted simultaneously. For example, during the multidimensional Cooperative Nugget 97, more than 3,000 military personnel from three NATO countries and 17 Partnership for Peace countries were trained at the JRTC. Simultaneously, two company or field grade officers from each participating nation were involved in the staff officer program. Civilians of comparable stature from other government agencies, NGOs and PVOs can also be included. The program included travel to the US Army Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and a session at Fort Benning, Georgia, for follow-on instruction.⁵⁰

Expected Problems

Many military members hesitate to institutionalize such training because they do not want humanitarian emergencies to interfere with training for traditional "warfighting" missions.⁵¹ Institutionalizing CHE training carries with it the perception of permanence. However, training for and participating in CHEs will not necessarily degrade warfighting readiness for most units. The key is to preserve warfighting skills while augmenting effectiveness at peace operations since "war-fighting and peace operations must not become alternatives but compatible and symbiotic techniques aimed at a common goal."⁵² Indeed, an estimated 90 percent of the training for peacekeeping is also training for general combat capability.⁵³ As we prepare for the missions we would like to fight, the real missions we are currently conducting—responses to CHEs—are "improvised at great expense to our readiness, unit integrity and quality of life of our service members."⁵⁴ Through increased exposure to CHEs, the

military will come to realize that, "peace operations and warfighting may seem diametric. . . . In fact, they are inextricably linked. The US Army has long accepted the value of combat training for deterring full-scale war and preserving national security. It must now recognize that multinational peace operations fill the same role, and thus give them appropriate care and attention."⁵⁵

While we anticipate that foreign militaries will enthusiastically participate in these exercises, some NGOs may fear a closer association with the military.⁵⁶ However, Joulwan believes that NGOs are ready to come on board as long as they are included in upper-level decision making.⁵⁷ In fact, a NGO participant at the 1996 JRTC exercise noted that nonmilitary players add "a new element to military decision making."⁵⁸ Multidimensional exercises would improve interagency coordination and the NGOs' familiarity with the military.⁵⁹ Interagency coordination at the planning as well as execution stages of training will better preserve the independence of the NGOs. In addition, greater NGO involvement will demonstrate the military's increasing appreciation and respect for the civilian role in responding to CHEs.

This proposed training would not fundamentally solve any of the Army's problems. It would not change the Army's structure, rearrange the allocation of resources and personnel or modify Army doctrine. All it would do is take the best training that the Army has to offer—that conducted at JRTC, NTC and CMTC—and make it better reflect the types of missions the Army currently faces and will continue to face for at least the near future. As Peters reminds us, "one way or another, we will go. . . . Deployments often will be unpredictable, often surprising. And we frequently will be unprepared for the mission, partly because of the sudden force of circumstance but also because our military is determined to be unprepared for missions it does not want, as if the lack of preparation will prevent our going."⁶⁰

Although the Army is currently involved in a number of CHEs, it has been perceived by many as being unwilling to perform these missions. Richard Schulz, director of the international security studies program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, was recently quoted in the *Boston Globe* as saying, "the one service that has a different view about this is the Marine Corps. They are willing to do it."⁶¹ The Army must have the same willingness and reassert its role as the branch of choice in peacekeeping operations. Creating a routine training program for

CHEs will be a step in the right direction.

Clearly, training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training to fight and win in combat. However, the traditional rule for regulating conflict and

security, *si vis pacem, para bellum* (if you want peace, prepare for war), must be modified. Today, we have an additional principle in conflict resolution: *si vis pacem, para pacem*: if you want peace, prepare for peace.⁶² **MR**

NOTES

1. Ralph Peters, "Heavy Peace," *Parameters* (Spring 1999), 73-74.
2. Doug Lute, *Improving National Response to Complex Emergencies* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998). 2. Lute defines complex emergencies as those that "combine internal conflict with large scale displacements of people, mass famine and fragile or failing economic, political and social institutions."
3. Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996), 10-12.
4. Thomas H. Johnson, "The Task Structure of International Peace Operations," presentation given at the 39th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, MN, March 1998.
5. Jennifer Morrison Taw, David Perssellin and Maren Leed, *Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), 62.
6. Stephen Lee Meyers, "Politically Astute Generals Picked to Lead Services," *The New York Times*, 22 April 1999.
7. For example, John E. Lange wrote that Operation *Support Hope* in Rwanda showed significantly different perspectives between the military and civilians involved. Lessons learned in exercises have focused on improving civil-military coordination in humanitarian operations. "These efforts should continue, particularly given the certainty that the military will be called upon again to support humanitarian relief efforts when they exceed the capacity of humanitarian agencies to handle them. Improved planning and coordination is particularly important between the armed forces and the international organizations and NGOs that specialize in humanitarian relief." See "Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda," *Parameters* (Summer 1998), 106.
8. Don Snider, "Let the Debate Begin: It's Time For An Army Constabulary Force," *ARMY* (June 1998), 14-16. Also Goodpaster argues that "national force structures may need to be adjusted to deal more effectively with foreign internal conflicts. For example, additional military police units may be needed as military forces become increasingly involved with operations that put them into direct contact with civilian populations on a regular basis," in *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough*, 7.
9. Jennifer Morrison Taw and John E. Peters, *Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), xiii.
10. *Ibid.*, 10 and 28.
11. George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 5-6.
12. General George A. Joulwan, interview by Cadet Young, 7 December 1998, West Point, NY.
13. Joulwan and Shoemaker, 1.
14. Goodpaster, 14.
15. LTC James H. Baker, "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations," *Parameters* (Spring 1994), 19 and 24. Baker has served with the Peacekeeping Forces in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, Lebanon and the Iraq-Kuwait Demilitarized Zone.
16. Janet E. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The UN in Cambodia* (New York: The Twentieth Century Foundation Press, 1994), 128.
17. Clayton E. Beattie, "The International Peace Academy and the Development of Training for Peacekeeping," in *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals*, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), 214. Interestingly enough, Mats R. Berdal noted that "it is worth stressing in this context that the performance of UN peacekeeping troops does not follow the simple division between Western first world armies and those of the developing countries, although it is often alleged that it does. The most successful contingents in Cambodia are widely thought to be those from India and Uruguay, while Moroccans and Italians in Somalia are both highly respected for their rapport with the local population." In "Whither UN Peacekeeping?" *Adelphi Paper 281* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1993), 47.
18. Cited by SSG John Valceanu, "Centrazbat '98," *Soldiers* (February 1999), 5-6.
19. *Ibid.*, 7.
20. "Memorandum for Correspondents" [Online] (accessed 27 February 1999); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May1997/m052997_m088-97.html> and Internet; homepage: *DefenseLINK* [Online] available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil>>; Internet.
21. Taw, *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 23.
22. Lute, 6.
23. Joulwan and Shoemaker, 9.
24. Max G. Manwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia," *Parameters* (Winter 1998-99), 32.
25. Joulwan and Shoemaker, 1.
26. *Ibid.*, 2.
27. Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), II-1.
28. Taw, 3.
29. *Ibid.*, 10 and 19.
30. Doll and Metz, 17.
31. *Ibid.*, 21.
32. COL Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success," *Parameters* (Spring 1994), 48. Farris recently stepped down as director of the Peacekeeping Institute at the US Army War College. He also served as the senior US military observer for the UN Mission in Cambodia.
33. Charles H. Swannack and LTC David R. Gray, "Peace Enforcement Operations," *Military Review* (November-December 1997), 8.
34. United States European Command Headquarters, *Action Review: Operation Support Hope* (Rwanda) 1994, (Europe: USEUCOM, 1995).
35. Taw, 22-23.
36. Lange, 106.
37. Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, ed., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), 37.
38. William J. Doll and Steven Metz, *The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), 4. This report is a result of a roundtable discussion that took place on 29 November 1993 and was sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, the US Army War College and the US Army Peacekeeping Institute at the US Army War College.
39. Peters, 79.
40. Johnson.
41. Swannack and Gray, 9.
42. Ralph Peters, 71.
43. Tom McNaughter, interview by Cadet Young, 30 March 1999, West Point, NY.
44. Some units are already making such adaptations in the field. For an example, see John A. Nagl and Tim Huening, "Nearly War: Training a Divisional Cavalry Squadron for Operations Other Than War" *Armor* (January/February 1996), 23-24.
45. OOTW is the Army's term for noncombat operations, including responses to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. While OOTW is an option at JRTC, most units still choose standard exercises (Taw, Parsellin and Leed, 31).
46. B. Novovitch, 14 August 1994, "US Troops Stage Major 'Peacekeeping' Exercise," Reuters, Limited.
47. Swannack and Gray, 10.
48. Telephone interview with MAJ Bill Costello, JRTC Public Affairs Officer, 19 Dec 99.
49. Telephone interview with MAJ Barry Johnson, NTC Public Affairs Officer, 19 Dec 99.
50. *DefenseLINK*.
51. Lute, 7.
52. Doll and Metz, 1.
53. Mats R. Berdal, "Whither US Peacekeeping?" *Adelphi Paper 281* (London: Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1993), 47.
54. See Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973). Weigley argues that "in the history of American strategy, the direction taken by the American conception of war made most American strategists, through most of the time span of American history, strategists of annihilation," xii. Also see Ralph Peters, 76.
55. Doll and Metz, 22.
56. Many countries already conduct multinational peacekeeping training exercises. For example, the Scandinavian countries, which have donated over one-quarter of all UN peacekeepers, have established joint programs to train volunteers for peacekeeping missions. Recently, the Nordic Brigade has cooperated with Poland to form a joint Nordic-Polish Brigade that served with IFOR in Bosnia. This approach has been emulated by countries such as Austria, Malaysia and Switzerland. However, informal interviews with CNN World correspondent Ralph Begleiter (22 November 1998) and Council on Foreign Relations member and Yale Law Professor Ruth Wedgwood (26 November 1998) have both brought to light the fact that NGOs often are fearful of losing independence or being seen as too connected to the military.
57. Joulwan interview.
58. Novovitch.
59. Taw, 23.
60. Ralph Peters, 74.
61. *The Boston Globe*, 7 March 1999.
62. Michael Renner, *Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping* (Worldwatch Institute, May 1993), 5-6.

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